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Abstract
We document that "persistent and lagged" in￿ ation (with respect to output) is a world-
wide phenomenon in that these short-run in￿ ation dynamics are highly synchronized across
countries. In particular, the average cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is signi￿cantly and
systematically stronger than that of output, while the cross-country correlation of money growth
is essentially zero. We investigate whether standard monetary models driven by monetary shocks
are consistent with the empirical facts. We ￿nd that neither the new Keynesian sticky-price
model nor the sticky-information model can fully explain the data. An independent contribution
of the paper is to provide a simple solution technique for solving general equilibrium models
with sticky information.
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11 Introduction
The nature of short-run in￿ ation dynamics is one of the most eminent issues in macroeconomics. It
can be traced back in the literature to at least as early as Phillips (1958). Although sophisticated,
the modern incarnation of the sticky-price theory, based on the early work of Taylor (1980) and
Calvo (1983), is incapable of explaining in￿ ation dynamics in two important aspects (as noted by
Fuhrer and Moore, 1995): First, it cannot explain the persistence in the in￿ ation rate. Second, it
cannot explain why in￿ ation systematically lags output. The lack of in￿ ation persistence in the
models implies that monetary policy can drive a positive rate of in￿ ation to zero with virtually
no loss of output (see, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). It also implies that announced disin￿ ations
can cause booms rather than recessions, which contradicts the historical experience of the U.S.
economy (Ball, 1994). Further, the forward-looking property of the in￿ ation dynamics embodied
in the standard sticky-price model implies that a policy of permanently falling in￿ ation can keep
output permanently high. This implication is criticized by McCallum (1998) on the grounds that it
violates a strict form of the natural rate hypothesis, according to which there is no in￿ ation policy
that will keep output permanently high.
In response to this challenge, Mankiw and Reis (2002) develop a "sticky-information" model
in which information di⁄uses slowly throughout the population. This slow di⁄usion could arise
because of costs of acquiring information or costs of reoptimization. As a consequence, ￿rms￿
pricing decisions are not always based on current information. Mankiw and Reis show that a
rational expectations monetary model featuring sticky information is capable of overcoming the
aforementioned shortcomings of the sticky-price models.1
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we ask whether the typical output-in￿ ation
dynamics emphasized by the literature are a world-wide phenomenon. Our empirical investigation
shows that the answer is "Yes". Just like in the U.S., in￿ ation in other industrial countries is also
highly persistent and systematically lags output by several quarters. More importantly, we show
that such in￿ ation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries. Namely, a high in￿ ation
in the U.S. after an output boom is often associated with a high in￿ ation in Europe at the same
time. This phenomenon of positive cross-country correlation in in￿ ation is linked to the fact that
in￿ ation systematically lags output in each country and that output is positively correlated among
countries. However, the data also indicate that the cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is much
stronger than the cross-country correlation of output. For example, in our sample of 18 OECD
countries, the average correlation of in￿ ation is about 0:6 while that of output is about 0:2.
What forces are responsible for the global comovements in in￿ ation dynamics? Modern mon-
1State-dependent pricing or hybrid sticky-price models can also overcome these shortcomings. See, e.g., Dotsey
and King (2005) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
2etary theories attribute the persistent short-run in￿ ation dynamics to exogenous monetary shocks
under nominal rigidities (see, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Christiano et al., 2005; Dotsey and
King, 2005; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; and Woodford, 2001, among many others). Yet we ￿nd that
movements in the money stock are not signi￿cantly and systematically correlated across countries.
This fact alone, however, may not necessarily imply a low correlation in in￿ ations since business
cycles can propagate across country borders even though they may be driven by country-speci￿c
monetary shocks. For this reason, the second purpose of our paper is to investigate whether stan-
dard monetary models with nominal rigidities can simultaneously account for the within-country
output-in￿ ation dynamics and the cross-country output-in￿ ation correlations based on the cali-
brated international covariance of monetary shocks. We ￿nd the answer to be negative. Under
country-speci￿c money growth shocks, the models are not able generate strongly positively cor-
related in￿ ation rates across countries while maintaining their ability to account for the domestic
output-in￿ ation relationship. This ￿nding casts doubt on the view that exogenous monetary shocks
are the main driving force of short-run in￿ ation dynamics.
The third purpose of this paper, which can be viewed as an independent contribution to the
literature, is to provide a simple solution technique to solve DSGE models with sticky-information.
While conceptually simple, a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky-information is di¢ cult
to solve. The di¢ culty arises because of the potentially large number of lagged expectation oper-
ators, which can create an extraordinarily large state space. In our method, variables with lagged
expectations are replaced by their forecast errors with undetermined coe¢ cients. Hence the prob-
lem of a large state space is avoided (see Appendix B for details of our solution method). Given that
the sticky-information model is becoming increasingly popular, we think this solution technique is
a timely contribution to the literature, especially for those who want to estimate sticky-information
models with a large number of lagged expectation operators by traditional econometric methods.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We ￿rst present three stylized facts about
short-run in￿ ation dynamics: (a) in￿ ation is highly persistent and it lags output within each
country; (b) in￿ ation is strongly correlated across countries and the correlation is stronger than that
of output; and (c) money growth is not signi￿cantly correlated across countries. We then show that
models with nominal rigidities and independent monetary shocks cannot simultaneously explain
these stylized facts. Since the literature has already found that the sticky-information model is a
good model to explain fact (a), we focus ￿rst on the sticky-information model￿ s ability to explain fact
(b). After showing that the sticky-information model cannot explain fact (b) without deteriorating
its ability to explain fact (a), we then show that the same is true for sticky-price models as well.
2For an example of solving DSGE models with sticky information by traditional methods, see AndrØs, L￿pez-
Salido, and Nelson (2005). The literature studying sticky-information models includes AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and
Nelson (2005), Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005), Coibion (2006), Jensen (2005), Keen (2005), Koenig (2004), Mankiw
and Reis (2002), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), and Trabandt (2005), among others.
32 Stylized Facts
We begin by looking at postwar in￿ ation dynamics for 18 developed countries. The data are from
the IMF ￿nancial statistics and the OECD database (see Appendix A for detailed data descriptions).
The in￿ ation rates are computed based on the consumer price index (CPI).3 We use the Band-Pass
￿lter to de￿ne the output gap (business cycle components of GDP). The results are similar if the
HP ￿lter is used instead. Some OECD countries have only seasonally unadjusted data available
for prices and money stocks. In that case, seasonal adjustment by the X-11 ￿lter is performed
whenever needed.
Figure 1 graphs the domestic relationships (correlations) between output (yt) and in￿ ation (￿t)
for each of the individual countries in our sample, for leads and lags up to six quarters. Several
patterns emerge from the graphs. First, the contemporaneous correlation between output and
in￿ ation is positive for all individual countries except Norway and Portugal, where the correlation
is zero. Second, in￿ ation systematically lags output. The maximum correlations between output
and in￿ ation always take place at a lag k ￿ 0 for all of the 18 countries, with an average of k = ￿2:2
quarters. This is why the curves tend to be "z" shaped with a negative slope around k = 0. Letting
j be the index for the 18 countries in alphabetic order (as in Figure 1), the number of periods that
in￿ ation lags output for each country is given by the sequence
fkjg = f￿2;￿2;￿1;￿3;￿4;￿4;￿1;￿2;0;0;￿3;￿1;￿1;￿4;￿4;￿2;￿2;￿3g:
3Since CPI is not available in Germany until the 90s, we use the GDP de￿ ator for Germany.
4Figure 1. Lead-Lag Relationship (Cor(yt+k;￿t)) between Output and In￿ ation.
This lagged relationship of in￿ ation to output is not a consequence of the ￿lters used to extract
the business cycle components (the Band-Pass ￿lter has no phase e⁄ects on the time series). We
also ￿nd a similar pattern if instead the HP ￿lter is used or the in￿ ation rates are not ￿ltered.4
In￿ ation in each country is also highly persistent. If we measure the persistence of in￿ ation by
its AR(1) coe¢ cient (￿j), where j is the country index, then the following sequence shows the






which has a mean of 0:77 with a standard deviation of 0:12.5
It is well known that standard sticky-price models cannot explain the persistence in in￿ ation
and the lead-lag relationships between output and in￿ ation. This inability of sticky-price models
4Den Haan and Sumner (2004) use a VAR forecast errors method and they also ￿nd that output leads in￿ ation
in the G7 countries.
5If higher order processes are estimated, the persistence is even stronger. For example, based on AR(2) model,
the average persistence (measured by the sum of the two coe¢ cients) is 0:84.
5is the primary reason for Mankiw and Reis proposing to replace the New Keynesian sticky-price
model with their sticky-information model.
Table 1. Cross-Country Correlations in In￿ ation (Mean = 0:62)
Canada England France Germany Italy Japan USA
Canada 1 0.66 (0.61) 0.83 (0.60) 0.39 (0.20) 0.84 (0.77) 0.62 (0.17) 0.74 (0.87)
England 1 0.70 (0.52) 0.34 (0.34) 0.71 (0.70) 0.70 (0.29) 0.78 (0.72)
France 1 0.29 (0.26) 0.92 (0.73) 0.60 (0.26) 0.76 (0.65)
Germany 1 0.30 (0.29) 0.36 (0.16) 0.26 (0.30)
Italy 1 0.67 (0.25) 0.76 (0.82)
Japan 1 0.70 (0.16)
USA 1
What is more interesting about the output-in￿ ation dynamics, however, is that the dynamic
movements in in￿ ation are highly synchronized across individual countries. Namely, a high rate of
in￿ ation in one country following an output boom is also associated at the same time with a high
rate of in￿ ation in another country. For example, Table 1 reports the cross-country correlations
of in￿ ation for the G7 countries based on CPI (numbers in parentheses are based on the GDP
de￿ ator). It shows that the in￿ ation rates between any country pairs are positively correlated. The
minimum value is 0:26 (between Germany and the USA), the maximum is 0:92 (between France
and Italy). The sample average is 0:62. Table 1 also shows that the pattern is robust when the
GDP de￿ ator is used instead (see numbers in parentheses). For the entire sample, there are a
total of 18 countries and 153 possible pairs. Consequently, we have 153 correlation coe¢ cients.
The information is summarized in the upper-left window in Figure 2, which shows that, with no
exceptions, in￿ ation (￿) is positively correlated across developed countries. The average of the
correlations for the entire sample is 0:57.
This strong comovement in in￿ ation among countries is striking. It could be associated with
the long-standing puzzle that output is positively correlated among countries. The upper right
window in Figure 2 reveals that output (y) is also positively correlated across countries, but with
the correlations signi￿cantly weaker than those of in￿ ation. For example, the sample mean of
the output correlations is only 0:18 (with a relatively large standard deviation of 0:29), while the
sample mean of the in￿ ation correlations is 0:57 (with a relatively small standard deviation of 0:17).
In addition, the lower panel in Figure 2 shows the relationship between a country pair￿ s in￿ ation
correlation and the same country pair￿ s output correlation for all of the 153 country pairs (each
point on the graph represents one country pair with its in￿ ation correlation on the vertical axis
and its output correlation on the horizontal axis). Two important patterns are worth noticing:
First, country pairs with higher cross-country correlations in in￿ ation also tend to have higher
6correlations in output (the slope of the regression line is 0:17, which implies a correlation of 0:41
between in￿ ation correlation and output correlation for the full sample of country pairs). Second
and more importantly, the in￿ ation correlations are stronger than output correlations for most of
the 153 country pairs because most of the points in the graph lie above the 45￿ line.6
Figure 2. Synchronization in In￿ ation and Output.
The stylized fact that cross-country correlations in in￿ ation are signi￿cantly positive and sys-
tematically higher than those of output is puzzling from the view point of real-business-cycle theory,
according to which real shocks explain the international comovements in output, which in turn dic-
tate the comovements in prices. Since in di⁄erent countries in￿ ation lags output for di⁄erent periods
(as seen in Figure 1), the cross-country correlations for output are thus expected to be higher than
those for in￿ ation if movements in output drive the movements in prices (see the arguments in Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1990). But the data indicate the opposite ￿namely, that in￿ ation correlations
are much stronger than output correlations.
Oil shocks may be responsible for the cross-country in￿ ation comovements. To investigate this
possibility, we have re-computed the cross-country correlations of in￿ ation using core in￿ ation,
which is based on a measure of CPI excluding food and energy. The results are very similar. For
6The international synchronization in output has been under intensive investigation by the real-business-cycle
literature (see, e.g., Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992), but no consensus has been reached regarding the underlining
forces of the output correlations (see Wen, 2005, for a more recent analysis).
7example, based on core in￿ ation, the average correlation of in￿ ation among all country pairs is 0:59
with a standard deviation of 0:16.7 Hence the oil shocks, even if they are responsible, cannot be
the full story behind the international synchronization in in￿ ation.8
What are then the causes of this international synchronization in in￿ ation? A natural candidate
is coordinated monetary policies among the developed countries. However, we document that
movements in the money stock, measured either by currency in circulation, by total monetary
reserves, by M1, or by the velocity of money are not signi￿cantly or systematically correlated
across countries. Table 2, for example, shows that the correlations in money growth (M1) among
the G7 countries do not have a systematic pattern: they are either negative or positive. The
average of the correlations for the G7 countries is essentially zero (mean = 0:05). For the entire
sample, the correlations of money growth range from ￿0:46 (between Finland and Denmark) to
0:36 (between Sweden and Belgium). The mean of the full sample is 0:06 with a standard deviation
of 0:14. Hence the correlations are not signi￿cant.9 The results are very similar when M0 and total
monetary reserves are used as the measure of money supply for each country. For example, among
the G7 countries, the average correlation of money growth in terms of M0 is 0:14 with a standard
deviation of 0:15. For the entire sample, the average correlation is 0:11 (with a standard deviation
of 0:13) based on M0; and it is 0:03 (with a standard error of 0:13) based on total monetary
reserves.10
Table 2. Cross-Country Correlations in M1 Growth (Mean = 0:05)
Canada England France Germany Italy Japan USA
Canada 1.00 0.05 -0.26 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.16
England 1 0.08 -0.02 0.35 0.10 -0.04
France 1 -0.09 0.31 0.00 -0.10
Germany 1 -0.01 -0.02 0.04
Italy 1 -0.04 0.25
Japan 1 -0.06
USA 1
Notice that in our sample many of the countries had their currencies pegged or linked to each
other for signi￿cant periods of the sample (i.e., during the European Monetary System), thus the
7We have also examined shorter samples that exclude the ￿rst and second major oil shock periods in the 70s and
the 80s, and we ￿nd that the cross-country correlations in in￿ ation are smaller but still signi￿cantly and systematically
stronger than those in output.
8We are not the ￿rst in the literature to document the international synchronization in in￿ ation. Other people
have also noticed that in￿ ation is highly correlated across countries, such as Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005), and Guo
et al. (2006). Our results, however, not only reinforce their ￿ndings from a di⁄erent perspective, but also highlight a
new stylized fact: in￿ ation correlations are signi￿cantly and systematically stronger than output correlations across
countries, regardless of which price index is used.
9Countries like Finland, England, Norway, Denmark, and Belgium do not have M1 data over the full sample. We
use the currency in circulation instead for these countries.
10We also computed the cross-country correlations in the velocity of money and we found no evidence of signi￿cant
correlations across countries. For more details, see Section 5.4.
8in￿ ation rates of these countries may be tied to each other by policy. To check whether this has
an important e⁄ect on the stylized facts we presented, we have also divided our sample into two
groups: Group 1 includes the EMU members and Group 2 includes the rest of the countries. The
results are summarized in Table 3. They show that both groups have similar degrees of cross-county
correlations in in￿ ation, output, and money growth. In particular, money growth is not signi￿cantly
correlated while in￿ ation is highly correlated across countries within each group, regardless of which
measure of money stock or price index is used. This suggests that the stylized facts we presented
above are robust.11
Table 3. Correlation Statistics for EMU Members and Non-EMU Members￿
M0 M1 ￿ ￿core
Group 1 0.17 (0.11) 0.09 (0.13) 0.58 (0.20) 0.62 (0.19)
Group 2 0.06 (0.11) 0.05 (0.14) 0.57 (0.13) 0.58 (0.12)
All Countries 0.11 (0.13) 0.06 (0.14) 0.57 (0.17) 0.59 (0.16)
￿
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Group 1 includes Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain. Group2 includes Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the USA.
Figure 3. Synchronization in Money Growth.
The existence of a signi￿cant and systematic relationship among the in￿ ation rates and the
11Since Sweden, Norway, and Austria did not join the EMU until 1996 and our data end in 1998, the three
countries are included in the non-EMU member group. One possible explanation for the lack of signi￿cant cross-
country correlations in money growth among the EMU members is that currencies among these countries are not
exactly pegged, but linked with a fairly wide ￿ oating band.
9simultaneous lack of a signi￿cant and systematic relationship among the money growth rates are
recaptured by the graphs in Figure 3, where the top window shows the distribution of cross-country
correlations of money growth, and the bottom window shows the relationship between the in￿ ation
correlation and money growth correlation for each country pair in our sample (each country pair
is represented by one point in the graph). The slope of the regression line in the bottom window
is 0:004, which implies a correlation of 0:006. It suggests that the international synchronization in
in￿ ation has little to do with coordinated monetary shocks across countries.
But this lack of a systematic relationship in money growth across countries does not nec-
essarily imply that money is not responsible for the international comovements in in￿ ation, since
country-speci￿c monetary shocks may still be able to generate synchronized price movements across
countries via some international propagation mechanism. Thus, if monetary shocks, as argued by
both the New Keynesian sticky-price literature and the recent work of Mankiw and Reis, are
truly responsible for the output-in￿ ation dynamics documented in Figure 1, then the data suggest
that there must exist a strong international transmission mechanism that can propagate country-
speci￿c money shocks into synchronized price movements in neighboring countries. Are sticky prices
or sticky information the culprit of the in￿ ation synchronization? This question is addressed in
the following sections. Since the literature has already shown that sticky information is the better
model for explaining the domestic in￿ ation dynamics, we examine its implications for cross-country
comovements in in￿ ation ￿rst before turning to sticky prices.
3 The Benchmark Model
3.1 Firms
The benchmark model consists of two identical countries, called Home and Foreign (H and F).
Assume that each country produces a single ￿nal good using intermediate goods and that only the















where ￿ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate goods, Y (i). Letting






Yt; and the relationship between the ￿nal good price and intermediate goods prices is





Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive ￿rm according to
10the following technology, Yt(i) = Nt(i). Intermediate good ￿rms face perfectly competitive factor
markets, and are hence price takers. Pro￿ts are distributed to households at the end of each period.





Yt(i), where MCt is the marginal cost, which
is the same for all ￿rms. Under constant returns to scale, it is also the average cost.
Sticky Information. In each period, a fraction 1￿￿ of ￿rms update information about the state
of the economy and set their optimal prices accordingly. The rest continue to set their prices based
















t Yt): According to Mankiw and Reis, the aggregate







1￿￿ : Log-linearizing the above two equations,




mct + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 X
j=0
￿jEt￿1￿j(￿t + ￿mct)]; (2)
where ￿t = log(Pt=Pt￿1) denotes the in￿ ation rate. Clearly, in￿ ation in the sticky information
model depends not only on current economic activities, but also on past expectations of current
economic conditions.
3.2 Households
There is one representative household in each country and only one type of ￿nal good in the world.
In order to best capture the Mankiw-Reis idea in our general equilibrium model where money
demand is endogenous, we assume that purchases of the ￿nal goods are subject to a cash-in-advance
constraint. We also assume that ￿nancial markets are complete, hence households can trade for a
complete set of state-contingent bonds to borrow and lend. The bonds are denominated in home
currency. The history of events realized up to period t is denoted by st = (s0;s1;:::;st). The initial
state, s0, is given. Let B(st+1) denote the home household￿ s holdings of a bond purchased in period
t that pays one unit of the home currency in period t+1 if state st+1 occurs, and 0 otherwise. The
price of this bond in units of the home currency is denoted by Q
￿
st+1jst￿
. To simplify notation,
we denote x(st) ￿ xt for any variable after the realization of the state st.
Consider the home country. In the beginning of each period t, based on the realization of st,
the household receives a money transfer in home currency in the amount Xt; and a payo⁄ of Bt
additional units of home currency. Hence, the household￿ s total nominal assets at the beginning of
period t is Mt + Xt + Bt; where Mt is the household￿ s money holdings in home currency carried
11over from the last period, which is contributed from wage and pro￿t income. Because of the cash-
in-advance constraint, the household needs home currency to purchase home goods and foreign
currency to purchase foreign goods. Let MHt denote the household￿ s demand for home currency in
period t, and MFt the household￿ s demand for foreign currency in period t. Hence the household
decides its portfolio of home and foreign currencies as well as future contingent bonds holdings
according to the budget constraint:
MHt + etMFt +
X
st+1
Q(st+1jst)B(st+1) ￿ Mt + Xt + Bt; (3)
where e = P
P￿ denotes the exchange rate, where P￿ denotes foreign price.12 After the portfolio
choices, the currency market is closed. Namely, the household can no longer re-adjust its currency
portfolio until the next period. The CIA constraints for the household￿ s demand of home and










The household receives wage and pro￿t income from intermediate good ￿rms after consumption
and portfolio decisions. The law of motion for the household￿ s money holdings is given by
Mt+1 = Bt + Mt + Xt ￿
X
st+1
Q(st+1jst)B(st+1) ￿ PtCHt ￿ etP￿
t CFt + WtPtNt + ￿t: (6)

















subject to (3)-(6). Since there is only one type of ￿nal good, we have C = CH +CF; which implies
perfect substitutability between home goods and foreign goods.
Denote f￿t=Pt;￿1t;￿2t;￿t=Ptg as the set of Lagrange multipliers for constraints (3)-(6), respec-








t = ￿t + ￿1;t (8)































where !(st+1jst) is the conditional probability of st+1 given st:
The household in the foreign country has an analogous set of ￿rst-order conditions. In particular,

















In equilibrium, all markets clear. Hence we have
MHt + M￿







Ht = Yt; (19)
CFt + C￿
Ft = Y ￿
t ; (20)
where the ￿rst two equations are money market clearing conditions, and the last two are goods
market clearing conditions. The money market clearing conditions state that total demand of
home (foreign) currency by both domestic and foreign residents must add up to total supply of
13home (foreign) currency. The goods market clearing conditions state that total demand of home
(foreign) goods by both domestic and foreign residents must add up to the total supply of home
(foreign) goods. In addition, the CIA constraints must bind: CHt = MHt












t : These CIA constraints and the market clearing conditions imply






which are identical to the money demand functions assumed in Mankiw and Reis (2002). Note that
e = P
P￿, hence the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to CH and CF imply ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿.







= Yt ￿ Ct (23)
= NXt
where NXt ￿ C￿
Ht ￿ CFt is net exports. The above equation is the standard accounting equation
that the current account (real net exports) plus the real capital account equals zero. This explains
why the asset market portfolio constraint (￿) is written the way it is, since the household￿ s total
home currency holdings (M + X) may not equal its total money demand, MHt + etMFt. The
household￿ s excess demand of currency, MH + eMF ￿ (M + X); is precisely the home country￿ s
capital account, B ￿
P
st+1 Q(st+1jst)B(st+1).
Accordingly, we can also write the equilibrium CIA constraint as




Note that this CIA constraint is di⁄erent from the conventional one assumed in the international
economics literature since the conventional CIA constraint, C = M+X
P , does not take into account
net exports. It is also this di⁄erence that makes the CIA constraint very di⁄erent from a Money-in-
Utility speci￿cation. We will discuss in a later section how this di⁄erence is crucial to preserve the
domestic output-in￿ ation dynamics of Mankiw and Reis (2002) in the two-country international
model. Denote xi;t = log(Mi;t+1=Mi;t) as the growth rate of the nominal money stock for country



















where the innovations f"h;"fg are uncorrelated i:i:d shocks with the same variance ￿2.
143.4 Solution Method
The details of the method are described in Appendix B. Here we only brie￿ y discuss how to apply
this method to solve the two-country sticky-information model. The most crucial step in the method
is to transform endogenous variables with lagged expectations, Et￿jSt; into j-step ahead forecast
errors, St￿Et￿jSt. To do so, we subtract (￿t + ￿wt) from both sides of Equation (2) and rearrange
terms to get13
wi;t = ￿wi;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
1 X
j=1
￿j [￿t + ￿wt ￿ Et￿j(￿t + ￿wt)]; (26)
where the second term on the RHS is a weighted sum of j-step ahead forecast errors, which can
always be expressed as functions of innovations in exogenous shocks. Thus, the lagged expected
endogenous variables are replaced by exogenous forcing variables with undetermined coe¢ cients
(since the decision rules are still unknown). With this new representation, we can then apply any
conventional method, such as that of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or King and Watson (1998), to
solve the model.
In order to apply the general solution method outlined in Appendix B to solve the sticky-
information model, we also need to approximate the in￿nite sum of j-step ahead forecast er-
rors on the right-hand side of (26) by a ￿nite sum:
PN
j=1 ￿j [St ￿ Et￿jSt] + oN+1, where St ￿
[￿t;wt;￿wt￿1]
0, and oN+1 is a higher-order residual term. Since ￿ < 1; limN!1 ￿N = 0. Hence
the error term oN+1 approaches zero as N increases. In practice we ￿nd that N = 20 gives very
accurate results.
4 Predictions
Calibration. The time period is a quarter. In order to best match the output-in￿ ation behavior
of the closed-economy Mankiw-Reis model, we set the risk aversion coe¢ cient ￿ = 0:05; and the
inverse labor supply elasticity ￿n = 0:05. These parameter values are assumed because larger values
tend to worsen the persistence of in￿ ation and its lagged relationship to output in the Mankiw-Reis
model.14 We set ￿ = 0:8; which is slightly larger than the value assumed by Mankiw and Reis but is
needed in our model in order to generate good results. This value implies that it takes information
￿ve quarters to spread across the entire population after an initial shock. We ￿nd that the larger
￿ is, the more in￿ ation lags output. We set the time discounting factor ￿ = 0:99, and the elasticity
of substitution parameter ￿ = 10 (implying a markup of about 10%) as in Mankiw and Reis. We
assume that money growth follows an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ￿ = 0:6, which is
13Notice that the real wage equals the real marginal cost, w = mc.
14More discussions on this issue can be found in the robustness analysis in the next section.
15consistent with Mankiw and Reis and much of the sticky-price literature.15 The parameter values
are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Calibrated Parameter Values
Model Parameter Values
A. Benchmark Model
Preference ￿ = 0:99;￿ = ￿n = 0:05
Production ￿ = 10
Stickiness Parameter ￿ = 0:8
Money Growth ￿ = 0:6
B. Model Variations￿
MIU ￿m = 0:05
Pricing Complementarity ￿ = ￿n = 1
Money Demand ￿d = 0:7
Taylor Rule ￿ = ￿n = 1;￿y = 0:5;￿￿ = 1:6;￿i = 0:95
Capital ￿ = 0:2;￿ = 0:025
C. Sticky Price Model ￿ = 1
￿
Note: The model variations use the same parameter values as the benchmark model except for those indicated in this table.
Impulse Responses. Figure 4 graphs the impulse responses of output, consumption, the real
wage, and the in￿ ation rate for both the home and foreign countries. The intuition for the impulse
response patterns of home and foreign countries can be understood as follows. After an unexpected
monetary growth increase at home, real wealth increases, hence consumption in both countries
increases due to risk sharing. Since leisure is a normal good, the labor supply curve shifts backward
in both countries, which leads to a higher real wage. In order to ￿nance the higher consumption
demand both at home and abroad, production must increase either at home or abroad, or both. But
a higher production in the foreign country is not an equilibrium since that implies an outward shift
of the labor demand curve, which causes the real wage to further increase in the foreign country.
A higher real wage implies a higher marginal cost of labor, hence a higher price level set by ￿rms.
This implies that the aggregate price level must also go up in the foreign country. The increased
output combined with an increased price level implies a higher demand for money. But this cannot
be an equilibrium since the foreign money supply has not changed. Thus output in the foreign
country must decrease. Therefore, output in the home country must go up, which implies a much
higher real wage and in￿ ation rate at home. At the same time, since output in the foreign country
decreases, the aggregate price level must increase to balance money demand with money supply
15A larger value of ￿ also tends to generate more lagged in￿ ation relative to output.
16in the foreign country. A lower output in the foreign country also implies a downward shift of the
labor demand curve, which explains why the real wage in the foreign country does not increase as
much as it does at home.






























Figure 4. Impulse Responses to a Home Money Shock (home = asterisk; foreign = circle).
Thus, in the initial impact period, the Mankiw-Reis sticky-information model is able to explain
the comovements in in￿ ation across countries under monetary shocks. However, as time goes
by, while in￿ ation at home gradually returns to zero because the shock to money growth is not
permanent, in￿ ation in the foreign country must become negative before returning to zero. This
is because the foreign price level must eventually return to the steady state. If in￿ ation is always
non-negative, it would imply a permanently higher price level in the long run in the foreign country.
Due to this dynamic in￿ ation reversal in its transitional dynamics in the foreign country, the overall
cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, since the initial positive
correlation is o⁄set by later negative correlations.
Notice that the in￿ ation rate is highly persistent and it lags output both at home and abroad.
Under our parameter calibration, the predicted persistence is ￿h = 0:98 for the Home and ￿f = 0:89
for the Foreign country. The predicted lag period is kh = 2 for the Home and kf = 3 for the Foreign
country. These predictions are consistent with the data presented in Section 2. But, regarding
the cross-country correlation in in￿ ation, the model predicts corr(￿h;￿f) = 0:01, which is not
signi￿cant at all. However, a higher correlation can be generated from the model if we reset the
parameter ￿ to a much higher value. Higher values of ￿; unfortunately, completely destroy the
17lead-lag relationship between output and in￿ ation, deteriorating the model￿ s prediction on other
dimensions.16 Furthermore, the predicted cross-country correlation for output is always negative.
This negative correlation in output is a robust feature of the model. For this reason, the following
robustness analyses focus on in￿ ation only.
5 Robustness Analysis
5.1 Money-in-Utility
We consider several robustness analyses with respect to the low cross-country correlation of in￿ ation
implied by the sticky-information model.17 First, we show that a quantity relationship in terms of
aggregate demand (not just consumption), PY = M, is crucial for the sticky-information model to
explain the persistent and lagged in￿ ation dynamics. Hence, adopting other speci￿cations of money
demand will not improve the model. In particular, if the money-in-utility (MIU) speci￿cation is
used instead, the model not only is unable to explain the persistent and lagged in￿ ation movements
with respect to output, but also implies a strongly negative cross-country correlation for in￿ ation.
For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in Table 4, the cross-country correlation
predicted by MIU is ￿0:74. The intuition for the negative cross-country correlation in in￿ ation
is that under the MIU speci￿cation, consumption and real balances always move together within
each country. Since a home-money injection leads to higher consumption both at home and abroad
under risk sharing, demand for real balances also increases in the foreign country. This must imply
a lower price level in the foreign country (since the money supply is ￿xed in that country) and
hence a negative cross-country correlation in in￿ ation.
Since the conventional CIA constraint in terms of consumption only, PC ￿ M, is just a special
case of MIU, a CIA speci￿cation in terms of consumption su⁄ers from the same problems as the
MIU speci￿cation. Thus, in order for the Mankiw-Reis model to generate persistent and lagged
in￿ ation dynamics consistent with the data in general equilibrium, and at the same time also
generate non-negative cross-country correlations in in￿ ation, a general CIA constraint in terms of
aggregate demand (C + NX) must be imposed. For the same reason, if capital is included in the
model, the CIA constraint must also include investment (see below).
5.2 Pricing Complementarity
Woodford (2003) shows that allowing for strong pricing complementarity can enhance in￿ ation
persistence in models with nominal rigidities. In particular, if the household￿ s utility function is
16See the robustness analysis in the next section (5.2).
17To preserve space, the impulse responses of each modi￿ed model are not reported. Interested readers are referred



















then even large values of ￿ and ￿n can generate highly persistent and hump-shaped in￿ ation.
The reason for this is as follows. With the modi￿ed utility function on leisure, the log-linearized
monopolist pricing rule is given by
pt(i) = Ei￿jpt + Et￿i
￿ct + ￿nyt + Rt
1 + ￿n￿
;
where Rt denotes the nominal interest rate.18 In the earlier model, the pricing rule is given by
pt(i) = Ei￿jpt + Et￿i (￿ct + ￿nyt + Rt):
Since persistence in in￿ ation requires that monopoly prices be insensitive to aggregate demand,
small values of ￿ and ￿n are required to generate persistent in￿ ation in the earlier model. In the
current model, since (1 + ￿n￿) appears in the numerator and ￿ is large, the requirement for small
values of ￿ and ￿n is no longer needed. Thus, even under large values of ￿ and ￿n, in￿ ation can
be persistent and hump-shaped. However, notice that the two models are the same when ￿n = 0.
Hence for small values of ￿n, the two models￿implications are similar. On the other hand, large
values of ￿n in the current model are equivalent to small values of ￿ and ￿n in the earlier model,
hence the implied cross-country correlation in in￿ ation remains small in the current model for large
values of ￿n. For example, when ￿ = ￿n = 1, the implied cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is
0:05; and when ￿ = 1;￿n = 6:7, the implied correlation is 0:009.19
5.3 With Capital
The literature has shown that adding capital to sticky-price models can signi￿cantly deteriorate the
dynamic properties of the models with respect to in￿ ation persistence (see, e.g., Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan, 2000). We show here that adding capital to the benchmark sticky-information model
does not change the model￿ s predictions signi￿cantly, as long as the CIA constraint is speci￿ed in
the general form that applies to all components in aggregate demand, C+I+NX ￿ M=P, where I
denotes investment.20 In particular, impulse response analysis shows that in￿ ation remains highly
persistent and lagging output both at home and abroad. Also, similar to the case without capital,
18Namely, Rt ￿ 1 + ￿t=￿t, where ￿ and ￿ denote Lagrange multipliers as in the benchmark model.
19These values imply
￿+￿n
1+￿￿n ￿ 0:1, which is consistent with the calibration in Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005).
20This result is ￿rst obtained by Wang and Wen (2005b) in closed-economy models with sticky-prices. To cali-
brate the model with capital, the production technology for intermediate goods is speci￿ed as Y = K
￿N
1￿￿: The
depreciation rate of capital is set to ￿ = 0:025. Also see Table 3 for parameter calibrations in this model.
19the cross-country correlations in in￿ ation are not signi￿cant because the foreign in￿ ation rate
reverses itself to negative shortly after an initial increase, while the home in￿ ation rate remains
positive until the shocks die out. For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in
Table 4, the implied cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is ￿0:07. The in￿ ation reversal takes
place because the price level in the foreign country has to return back to its steady state in the long
run. In other words, with the money supply held constant in the foreign country, the accumulated
changes in in￿ ation must sum to zero. Thus, if any model is able to generate hump-shaped in￿ ation
persistence in one country under country-speci￿c money growth shocks, then it must also imply a
lack of strong cross-country correlations in in￿ ation because of the necessary in￿ ation reversal in
the other country. This general statement holds true in all models with nominal rigidities regardless
of capital.
5.4 Money Demand Shocks
Suppose the source of monetary disturbances comes from money demand or from the level of the
money supply, instead of money growth. Then the model is able to generate signi￿cantly positive
cross-country correlations in in￿ ation. For example, let the household in each country face modi￿ed
CIA constraints in each period,









where DH;t and DF;t are random variables with zero mean, which represent shocks to money
demand. In a log-linearized world, they are also equivalent to shocks to the velocity of money.
The additive property of DH;t and DF;t simpli￿es the household￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. Thus, all
￿rst-order conditions of the household remain the same as in the benchmark model. Consequently,
in equilibrium we have






t + DF;t + D￿
F;t):
Denote Dt ￿ DH;t + D￿
H;t and D￿
t ￿ DF;t + D￿
F;t as aggregate money demand shocks in the home
country and the foreign country. Without loss of generality we assume that in the steady state




t; respectively, where dt ￿ Dt




￿ Y . We assume that money demand shocks
follow an AR(1) process for each country, dt = ￿ddt￿1 +"dt. Since dt also measures the negative of
20the velocity of money, we can use data from our sample to calibrate the process of money demand
shocks. We ￿nd that the cross-country correlations of money demand shocks are essentially zero.
The sample mean of the correlations for all country pairs is 0:18 with a standard deviation of 0:27
under the band-pass ￿lter (the sample mean is 0:13 with a standard deviation of 0:17 under the HP
￿lter).21 The sample mean of the AR(1) coe¢ cients is 0:7 under the HP ￿lter and 0:93 under the
band-pass ￿lter. The e⁄ects of money demand shocks on in￿ ation can be summarized as follows.
First, regardless of the value of ￿d, the predicted volatility of in￿ ation relative to output is too
small to match the data. For example, the volatility ratio (￿￿
￿y ) is 0:02 when ￿d = 0:7 and 0:04
when ￿d = 0:95. On this ground alone, money demand shocks can be ruled out as a good candidate
for explaining the in￿ ation dynamics. Second, if ￿d is su¢ ciently close to one, then the prediction
of the model starts to look similar to that under money growth shocks. Namely, although in￿ ation
is persistent and hump-shaped in the home country, the cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero because of the in￿ ation reversal in the foreign country. Third,
only if ￿d is su¢ ciently less than one can the cross-country correlation in in￿ ation be made large
enough to match the data, but then the persistence of in￿ ation disappears. Given that the variance
of money demand shocks and money growth shocks are similar in our sample (￿d = 0:027 and
￿u = 0:022), having a model with both types of shocks are unlikely to solve the problems since the
movements of in￿ ation under money supply shocks dominate those under money demand shocks.22
5.5 Endogenous Money Rule
Monetary policy shocks may take place in the form of interest rate shocks instead of money growth
shocks, and this may imply a di⁄erent cross-country propagation mechanism with respect to in￿ a-
tion. For this reason, we also consider endogenous monetary policy shocks to the Taylor rule:
it = ￿yyt + ￿￿￿t + vit;
where it represents the nominal interest rate and vit = ￿ivit￿1 + "it represents shocks to monetary
policy. Our analyses show that regardless of the values of the Taylor rule parameters, the cross-
country correlation of in￿ ation is always negative under independent shocks to the interest rate
21The fact that the cross-country correlations are high for in￿ ation but not for output, money supply, and the
velocity of money appears to be puzzling based on the identity, py = vm. This can be explained by the fact that
output is more volatile than prices, hence if nominal GDP is not highly correlated across countries (due to a weak
correlation in output), then so is the e⁄ective supply of money. Indeed, the estimated cross-country correlations for
nominal GDP are weak (the sample average is 0:17). This explains why the velocity of money is not highly correlated
(given that money stock is not highly correlated) across countries.
22The variance of in￿ ation under a one-standard-deviation shock to money growth is 745 times that under a one-
standard-deviation shock to money demand when ￿d = 0:7. However, this may not necessarily rule out the possibility
that there may be parameter combinations under which the model￿ s performance can be signi￿cantly improved. For
example, one may ￿nd such particular parameter combinations by estimating a full model with multiple shocks.
However, even though this is possible, the results are clearly not robust to perturbations in parameter values and
model structures, as shown in this paper.
21(i.e., corr("h;"f) = 0). For example, based on the calibrated parameters reported in Table 4, the
implied cross-country correlation of in￿ ation is ￿0:56. Although correlated shocks may resolve this
problem, the model does not perform well in explaining the domestic output-in￿ ation relationship.
For example, in order to generate highly persistent and hump-shaped in￿ ation within a country,
not only do the shocks need to be highly persistent (e.g., ￿i = 0:95), but also the interest rate
elasticities to output and in￿ ation need to be relatively large (e.g., ￿y = 0:5;￿￿ = 1:6). But in this
case, domestic output is negatively correlated with domestic in￿ ation, which is inconsistent with the
data. If the interest rate elasticity parameters are chosen such that the domestic output-in￿ ation
correlation becomes positive, in￿ ation then stops being persistent and hump-shaped.
The intuition of the negative cross-country in￿ ation correlation is as follows. A negative home
interest-rate shock is equivalent to a money injection at home. Hence it implies a higher price level
at home (positive in￿ ation). Consumption in both countries will increase due to risk sharing. In
the foreign country, in￿ ation must be negative since a positive in￿ ation cannot be an equilibrium.
Under the Taylor rule, a positive in￿ ation implies an even higher nominal interest rate, which implies
an increase in the real interest rate in the foreign country. This higher real rate induces agents to
save more and consume less, contradicting the original consumption increase. This explains the
negative cross-country correlation of in￿ ation. Under Taylor rules the output response in the foreign
country must be negative because a positive output response implies a higher labor demand, which
increases the marginal cost and consequently the price level, hence contradicting the conclusion
that the in￿ ation response in the foreign country is negative.
5.6 Correlated Money Supply Shocks
All of the previous robustness analyses regarding di⁄erent model variations indicate that inde-
pendent money growth shocks generate negative cross-country correlations in output and zero (or
negative) cross-country correlations in in￿ ation, in sharp contrast to the stylized facts reported in
Section 2. This subsection investigates whether correlated money shocks are able to improve the
sticky-information model in accounting for the data. The results are summarized in Table 5. In
the table, ￿m denotes the cross-country correlation in money growth shocks assumed in each of the




denote the implied cross-country correlations in
output and in￿ ation, respectively. For the model variation with money demand shocks considered
in Section 5.4, ￿m is replaced by ~ ￿d, which denotes the assumed value for the cross-country cor-
relation in money demand shocks. The other parameters of the models are calibrated as in Table
4.
22Table 5. Predicted Correlations
￿m 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
Benchmark Model ￿y ￿0:08 0:12 0:33 0:54 0:77
￿￿ 0:01 0:21 0:41 0:61 0:80
￿m 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
MIU ￿y ￿1:0 ￿1:0 ￿1:0 ￿1:0 ￿1:0
￿￿ ￿0:74 ￿0:63 ￿0:48 ￿0:25 0:15
￿m 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
Complementarity ￿y ￿0:19 ￿0:02 0:23 0:47 0:72
￿￿ 0:05 0:24 0:44 0:63 0:82
￿m 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
Capital ￿y ￿0:10 0:11 0:32 0:53 0:76
￿￿ ￿0:07 0:13 0:34 0:56 0:77
~ ￿d 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
Money Demand ￿y ￿0:02 0:18 0:39 0:59 0:79
￿￿ 0:46 0:60 0:73 0:83 0:92
￿m 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:6 0:8
Taylor Rule ￿y ￿0:77 ￿0:68 ￿0:54 ￿0:32 0:07




m 1 25 100 225 400
Two Shocks ￿y 0:03 0:13 0:17 0:18 0:18
￿￿ 0:10 0:13 0:17 0:24 0:29
Table 5 indicates that in order for the sticky-information model to match the average cross-
country correlation in in￿ ation (0:6) observed in the data, highly correlated money growth shocks
with a cross-country correlation around 0:6 are needed for the benchmark model and the model
with pricing complementarity. In this case, the two models are also able to generate signi￿cant
cross-country correlation in output. However, the MIU model and the model with the Taylor rule
are still unable to explain the cross-country correlations in output and in￿ ation even when the
cross-country correlation of money growth shocks is as high as 0:8. Notice that under a realistic
value of the cross-country correlation in money growth (0:1 ￿ 0:2), none of the models listed in
Table 5 are able to explain the strong correlations in in￿ ation across countries. For example, when
￿m = 0:2, the largest value for the in￿ ation correlation is 0:24, which is obtained in the model with
pricing complementarity.23
23Notice that this model behaves very similar to the benchmark model.
23However, the model with money demand shocks (the ￿fth panel in Table 5) is able to generate
strong cross-country correlations in output and in￿ ation. For example, when ~ ￿d = 0:2, the predicted
correlation is 0:18 for output and 0:60 for in￿ ation, matching the data closely. Unfortunately, as
explained in Section 5.4, money demand shocks are not able to generate a su¢ ciently volatile
in￿ ation rate. Thus, in a model with both money supply shocks and money demand shocks, it
is still unable to explain the data because the e⁄ect of money supply shocks dominates that of
money demand shocks. For example, the last panel in Table 5 reports predicted correlations of the
benchmark model under di⁄erent mixtures of money demand and money supply shocks (assuming





m = 1), which is consistent with the data reported in Section 5.4, the model is not able
to generate strong correlations in output and in￿ ation (￿y = 0:03 and ￿￿ = 0:1). Even when the
variance of money demand shocks is 400 times that of money supply shocks, the predicted cross-
country correlation in in￿ ation is 0:29, still substantially below the data (0:6). Thus, although a
mixture of both money demand and money supply shocks o⁄ers some hope in reconciling the model
with the data, there still remains a substantial distance between the two.
5.7 Fixed Exchange Rate
Although the data (Table 3) suggest that the cross-country correlations in in￿ ation and money
growth are similar regardless of the exchange rate system, it is nonetheless interesting to consider
whether the sticky-information model is able to generate a su¢ ciently large correlation in in￿ ation
with only mild correlations in money supply when money demand shocks are present. Since pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) holds in the model, a ￿xed exchange rate requires that in￿ ation in the
foreign country equals in￿ ation in the home country. The Phillips curve then implies that the real
wage is the same across countries. Due to perfect risk sharing, Equation (10) then implies that the
Lagrangian multiplier (￿) for constraint (3) is the same across countries. Based on these, Equation
(13) implies that the output level is the same across countries. The money market equilibrium
condition, mt = yt + dt, then implies mt ￿ dt = m￿
t ￿ d￿
t; or equivalently, u￿
t = ut + ￿d￿
t ￿ ￿dt.
Suppose that the foreign country pegs its exchange rate. This equation suggests that the foreign
country￿ s money growth is endogenously determined by the home country￿ s money growth shocks
and the di⁄erence between the two countries￿money-demand growth rates.
Assuming that both countries have similar money demand shocks and all shocks are indepen-





￿u is the standard deviation of monetary-supply growth and ￿￿d is the standard deviation of money-
demand growth. Since ￿dt = dt ￿dt￿1 and dt = ￿ddt￿1 +"dt, we can substitute ￿2
￿d = 2(1￿￿d)￿2
d




u + 4(1 ￿ ￿d)￿2
d
: (27)
In the data the variances of monetary demand and money supply are almost the same, hence
Equation (27) implies ￿m ’ 0:67 if ￿d = 0:7 (￿m ’ 0:85 if ￿d = 0:9). Such a high correlation of













For di⁄erent values of ￿m, Equation (28) implies di⁄erent values of the variance ratio between
money demand and money supply shocks. In the data, ￿m ’ 0:1. Based on this, the required
variance ratio is 83 under a ￿xed exchange rate. Table 5 shows that under a ￿ exible exchange
rate, a variance ratio of 100 can generate a cross-country in￿ ation correlation of about 0:17. Here,
under a ￿xed exchange rate, it only needs a variance ratio of 83 to generate a perfect cross-country
correlation in both in￿ ation and output. This shows that a linked exchange rate can improve the
model￿ s performance. However, the required variance ratio is still too high to be consistent with
the data. In addition, as shown in Table 3, countries without linked exchange rates also tend to
have a high correlation in in￿ ation and low correlation in money growth. Therefore, even if linked
exchange rates could explain the data associated with the EMU countries, there would still remain
the challenge to explain the data associated with the non-EMU countries.
6 Sticky Prices
In a standard Calvo-type sticky-price model, the Phillips curve equation (2) is replaced by the
following form:
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
wt (29)
which shows that in￿ ation depends on the current expectation of future economic variables instead
of on lagged expectations of economic variables. In this model, output and in￿ ation lack persistence
and in￿ ation does not lag output. For this reason, it is rejected by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and
Mankiw and Reis (2002) as a candidate for understanding in￿ ation dynamics. However, under the
general form of the CIA constraint in terms of aggregate demand (C +NX ￿ M=P), a sticky-price
model is able to generate hump-shaped output persistence and explain the positive cross-country
correlations in in￿ ation, as the top panel in Figure 5 shows. As is also clear from the graph,
25however, the model cannot simultaneously explain the positive cross-country correlation in output,
the hump-shaped in￿ ation dynamics, and its lagged relationship with output.24









(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿)￿
wt; (30)
and show that allowing for lagged in￿ ation in the Phillips curve can generate hump-shaped per-
sistent and lagged in￿ ation dynamics similar to those in the Mankiw-Reis model. Hence we also
consider the Christiano et al. type of Phillips curve in our two-country model.






























Figure 5. Impulse Responses to a Home Money Shock (Top Panel: Calvo Model; Bottom Panel:
Christiano et al. Model. Home = asterisk; Foreign = circle).
The bottom panel in Figure 5 shows that the hybrid model fails to predict positive cross-
country correlations for in￿ ation. As in the sticky-information model, although it can successfully
predict hump-shaped in￿ ation and its lagged relationship with output within each country, the
predicted cross-country correlation in in￿ ation is negative (￿0:28). In addition, the predicted
output correlation remains negative. Similar to the sticky-information model, the results are very
robust to parameter perturbations and model modi￿cations. The reasons for the failure are the
24If the Money-in-Utility (MIU) speci￿cation is used instead, the sticky-price model then implies negative cross-
country correlations in in￿ ation. Kollmann (2001) uses a two-country model with sticky prices and sticky wages to
study the comovement of output among G7 countries. He also found in his model a negative correlation between
home and foreign price levels under monetary shocks. Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005) show that a shopping-time
speci￿cation of money demand cannot generate in￿ ation persistence under monetary shocks.
26same as in the sticky-information model. Thus we conclude that sticky-price models, just like sticky-
information models, cannot simultaneously explain the within-country output-in￿ ation dynamics
and the cross-country output-in￿ ation synchronization.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we document stylized facts about output, in￿ ation, and money using a cross-county
analysis. We show that 1) persistent in￿ ation and its lead-lag relationship with output are a common
feature of developed economies; 2) such in￿ ation dynamics are highly synchronized across countries
with the cross-country correlations in in￿ ation signi￿cantly and systematically stronger than those
in output; and 3) changes in money stocks are not signi￿cantly correlated across countries. Since
conventional wisdom attributes short-run in￿ ation dynamics to monetary shocks, these stylized
facts (especially 2 and 3) appear to be puzzling. We investigate whether monetary models with
nominal rigidities can explain these stylized facts simultaneously. We ￿nd the answer to be negative.
The inability of the monetary models to explain the stylized facts simultaneously is robust to
model variations, such as endogenous monetary policy, di⁄erent speci￿cations of money demand, the
presence or absence of capital, ￿xed exchange rates, and allowing for money demand shocks. Thus,
we conclude that the short-run output-in￿ ation dynamics and their strong synchronization across
countries are unlikely a monetary phenomenon. The attempt to use monetary shocks to explain
output-in￿ ation dynamics could be misguided.25 Whether non-monetary shocks are responsible for
these stylized facts, however, is a challenging topic for further research. According to our sub-sample
analysis, the major oil shocks in the 070s and the early 080s may be partially responsible for the
strong international comovements in in￿ ation. But they cannot be the whole story since samples
excluding the energy prices and the major oil shock periods also show signi￿cant international
synchronization in in￿ ation. In addition, it is not clear that oil shocks can simultaneously explain
the within-country output-in￿ ation dynamics. What is clear, however, is that understanding the
sources of the international synchronization in in￿ ation is important both for developing monetary
models and for designing monetary policy.
Appendix A
This appendix describes the data source and data range. For within country statistics, we use the
full sample available for each country. For cross-country statistics, we choose the common sample
25The correlation between money growth and in￿ ation within a country is weak in the data. Fitzgerald (1999),
however, shows that the correlation is strong in the longer run (e.g., beyond a two-year horizon). This notwithstanding,
our purpose in this paper is to use a cross-country analysis to scrutinize the view commonly held in the monetary
literature that monetary shocks are the key driving force of short-run in￿ ation dynamics in each country. If this
view is correct, then monetary shocks should also be responsible for the cross-country comovements in in￿ ation. Our
analysis shows that this is not the case.
27period shared by all countries.26 The data include Gross Domestic Product (nominal GDP), GDP
de￿ ator (2000 = 100), Consumer Price Index (CPI, 2000 = 100), Consumer Price Index excluding
food and energy (to measure core in￿ ation, 2000 = 100), and Money Supply (M0, M1 and total
monetary reserve). The core in￿ ation data are available for all countries except Australia, Portugal,
and Sweden. For those countries where M1 data are not available, we use M0; this includes Belgium,
Denmark, England, Finland and Sweden. All data are either from the International Monetary Fund
(IFS data source) or from the OECD data bank. The following table gives details of the sample
periods available. Since many countries do not have money supply data available until 1977, and
since the money supply variables are only used for computing cross-country statistics, a common
sample period of 77:1-98:4 is used in the paper for computing all cross-country statistics. The
positive cross-country correlations in in￿ ation, however, are not an artifact of our sample period.
We have also used longer samples for countries where data are available, and we obtain similar
results.
Sample Periods (GDP, GDP De￿ ator, CPI)
Country Name Sample Period Country Name Sample Period
Australia 59:3 - 04:4 Italy 60:1 - 04:1
Austria 64:1 - 04:2 Japan 57:1 - 04:3
Belgium 80:1 - 04:2 Netherlands 77:1 - 04:3
Canada 57:1 - 04:4 New Zealand 87:2 - 04:3
Denmark 77:1 - 04:3 Norway 66:1 - 04:4
England 57:1 - 04:2 Portugal 66:1 - 04:4
Finland 70:1 - 04:2 Spain 70:1 - 04:4
France 70:1 - 04:2 Sweden 80:1 - 04:4
Germany 60:1 - 04:2 USA 57:1 - 04:4
Appendix B
This appendix describes brie￿ y the solution method for linear di⁄erence models with lagged
expectations (e.g., due to sticky information). More detailed discussions can be found in our working
papers (Wang and Wen, 2005c, 2006). Let Xt = [x1t;x2t;:::;xpt]
0 be a vector of non-predetermined
variables in period t, let Yt = [y1t;y2t;:::yqt]
0 be a vector of predetermined variables in period t; and
let Zt be an exogenous forcing variable with the law of motion given by Zt+1 = ￿Zt + "t+1; where
￿ 2 [0;1] and " is i:i:d. Let St = [X0
t;Y 0
t;Zt]
0 and let k = p + q + 1. A rational expectations DSGE
model with lagged expectation/information structure can be reduced to the following canonical
26The common sample period used is 77:1 - 98:4. We stop at 1998 because M1 data are available for most countries
only up to 1998. Since Belgium, New Zealand, and Sweden do not have data available until the 80s, we use their
growth rates to extrapolate the samples. Otherwise the common sample period becomes too short.
28dynamic system of equations:




where fA;B;￿i;i = 1;2;:::g are k￿k coe¢ cient matrices. System (1) can be solved in several steps:
Step 1. Express the forecast error St ￿Et￿iSt for i ￿ 1 as a ￿nite moving average process with
undetermined coe¢ cients f￿ig
N￿1
i=0 .
Since the solution for St should take the form St =
P1
i=0 ￿i"t￿i; where ￿i is k ￿ 1, we have
St￿Et￿iSt =
Pi￿1
j=0 ￿j"t￿j; for i = 1;2;:::;N: Using this property to substitute out Et￿iSt by their
forecast errors, Equation (1) can be rearranged into
AEtSt+1 = ~ BSt ￿ ￿￿￿t; (2)








Step 2. Solve Equation (2).
Equation (2) is a standard system of linear di⁄erence equations without lagged expectations.
Hence we can solve the system with standard methods such as those proposed by Blanchard and
Kahn (1980), King and Watson (1998) and Sims (2002). The solution is a set of decision rules














0 + G"t+1;where H(￿)
and M(￿) are coe¢ cient matrices that depend on the undetermined coe¢ cient matrix ￿.
Step 3. Solve for f￿0;￿1;:::;￿N￿1g:






￿0. The equilibrium decision rules and law of motion
are recaptured asXt = H(￿)Qt and Qt+1 = M(￿)Qt + G"t+1: Hence, the forecast errors are given
by








for i = 0;1;2;:::;N ￿ 1: Equation systems (4) and (3) can be stacked into the following form after




































Recall that ￿ is a diagonal super matrix with ￿j (j = 0;1;:::;N ￿ 1) as its diagonal elements.
Clearly, the equivalence of system (6) and system (5) constitutes kN equations with kN unknowns
in f￿jg
N￿1
j=0 . In particular, for i = 1;2;:::N, a term-by-term comparison between (5) and (6) for all
of the coe¢ cients of "t￿i suggests that P0(￿) = ￿0, P1(￿) = ￿1;:::;PN￿1(￿) = ￿N￿1, which can
be compactly expressed as P(￿) = ￿: The solution for the vector sequence f￿ig
N￿1
i=0 can thus be
found as a ￿xed point. Although analytical solutions exist, it can also be solved numerically using
standard packages in Gauss or Matlab.
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